


Anatomy of an Incident

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Accident pyramid








Five-step process of Integrated Safety Management







Anatomy of an incident



- The incident occurs
- The incident is investigated
- Causal factors are determined
- Conclusions are drawn
- Corrective actions are developed
- Lessons Learned are communicated



The incident occurs







The incident occurs



After



























- The metal halide lamp is designed around a sealed tube with an electrode in each end
- The Arc Tube temperature range is between 1000°C and 1300°C
- This type of metal halide lamp (ANSI M59/S) is position dedicated







- Lamp position is horizontal
- The fixture had an acrylic lens
- The acrylic material has a flash point > 250°C and an Auto-Ignition temperature > 400°C.






Causal factors are determined




NA--LASO-LANL-CHEMLASER-2015-0001: Light Fixture Fire





Causal factors are determined







Conclusions are drawn



- A wrong metal-halide lamp bulb caused a small fire.
- The acrylic lens material exacerbated the incident.
- The engineer should have required lenses that are compatible with metalhalide lamp.
- The worker should have known that he or she was installing the wrong bulb.



Conclusions are drawn



- The worker's supervisors should have checked the workers task and discovered that the wrong bulb was installed.
- The worker's manager should have monitored the workers task.
- Implementing Lesson's
 Learned from two previous
 incidences could have
 prevented the small fire.







Corrective actions are developed



- Position metal-halide lamp all in one direction
- Store only one type of metal-halide lamp bulbs Replace acrylic lens with lenses that are compatible with metal-halide lamp
- Iterate the importance of management monitoring programs










Defense in Depth







Slip simulator training









Year	ADPSM Employees	Total Trained*	With S/T/F Injuries
2011	481	0	8
2012	484	229	8
2013	491	385	5

*None of the Trained Employees Had an Injury





• Los Alamos NATIONAL LABORATORY EST. 1943

P-Value for a Chi Square Test

$$\chi^2 = \sum_{i} \sum_{j} \frac{\left(\mathcal{O}_{ij} - E_{ij}\right)^2}{E_{ij}}$$

	Injury (Slip, Trip, Fall)		
Trained	Yes	No	
Yes	0	614	
No	21	800	

 $X^2 = 15.9385$

The P value is 6.5E-05

This result is significant at p < 0.05

The association between rows (groups) and columns (outcomes) is considered to be extremely statistically significant







FILE LESSONS LEARNED REPORTS HERE SO WE CAN CONTINUE TO REPEAT FAILURE





- Metal halide light failures

 Small fires start when
 burning diffuser falls to
 ground, 2012-SR SRNS-0004, 2012
- Metal halide bulb fails, shatters outer glass envelope, hot glass shard chars wood crate, 2015-FSO-FNAL-022, 2015









- Assign a Metal-Halide Lamp Subject Matter Expert (SME)
- Have the Metal-Halide Lamp SME make an inventory of metal-halide lamps
- Have managers perform an inspection of metalhalide lamps in their areas of responsibility





- Have the Metal-Halide Lamp SME revise the Metal-Halide Lamp procedure such that corrective actions have been incorporated
- Have the Metal-Halide Lamp SME supervisor review Metal-Halide Lamp procedure





- Replace all metal-halide lamps with light-emitting diode (LED) lamps.
- LED lamps have a lifespan and electrical efficiency that is comparable to metalhalide lamps.
- LED lamps contain no mercury.






- No ballast bypass or rewiring is required.
- LED lamps operate at < 93 °C, are thermally regulated and may be positioned at any angle. In addition the operating life is 2 and half times longer than metal-halide lamps: 50,000 hr life vs 20,000 hr.




Predicting the future





How the people involved saw it before the accident








How the investigator sees it after the accident







Fire the person who reported It








Latent organizational conditions




- Managers going around telling there workers to be safe is difficult to track.
- Tracking preventive maintenance, safety meeting attendance, and chemical container inventory is easy to track.



What do you work on first?








Safety improvements are hard to prove

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EST. 1943


 Redundant defenses improve safety margins, but also increase complexity.

- Flawed defenses and safety hazards become more difficult to detect.
- Redundant defenses make safety improvements more difficult to identify as well.



Improvement can't be measured







Summary



- A wrong type of metal-halide lamp bulb exploded causing a small fire.
- Latent organizational conditions created error-likely situations and weaken defenses.
- Corrective action included standardizing the type of metalhalide lamp bulbs, replacing acrylic lens with lenses that are compatible with metal-halide lamp, and adding the inspection of metal-halide lamp to management monitoring programs.
- A significant improvement to the task consists of replacement of metal-halide lamps with LED lamps.
- This improvement was shared through a Lessons Learned Program.

Conclusions



- Latent organizational conditions that create error-likely situations and weaken defenses have been identified and controlled.
- Incorporating corrective actions selected from the DOE CAT provide corrective based on decades of incidences.
- Effective improvements have been implemented that reduce or eliminate the risk of another metal-halide lamp fire incidents.
- This increases technical knowledge and augments operational safety.

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